Blurred Dating — 863 Users Doxxed [GPS Coords + Pics] [Firebase 0auth] | 2026
by exfilar - Friday August 7, 2026 at 05:42 AM
#1
About the leak

Blurred — a US-based dating app with photo-blur reveal mechanics and 863 active users — left their production Firebase database completely open. Database: blurred-195721.firebaseio.com — no auth, no token, no referer check. Full read access. Anyone who types /.json at the end of the URL can dump the entire user database.

Inside: 861 email addresses (100% of users), 824 real names (95%), 826 birthdays with ages 18-74, 861 precise GPS coordinates (latitude/longitude to 14 decimal places), 786 FCM push notification tokens, gender identity + sexual orientation for every user, and profile photo URLs hosted in Firebase Storage. Full dating profiles with education, work history, conversation matches, and swipe history.

This is a dating app — the data is nuclear. GPS coordinates pinpoint users' homes, workplaces, and dating locations. Sexual orientation data. Private conversations between matched users. FCM tokens allow an attacker to push arbitrary notifications to 91% of the user base. This is stalker heaven and a privacy catastrophe.

The user base is heavily US: NYC (190), New York metro (102), Seattle (10), Los Angeles (5), Chicago (4), Miami (4). International users in Lagos (18), Accra (6), Toronto (6), and other African cities. Gender split: 405 male, 394 female, 14 nonbinary. The data is 100% real — verified profiles with signup dates, swipe counts, and active conversation logs.

Date: 06.08.2026
Format: Full Firebase RTDB JSON export + deep PII extraction + GPS coordinate dump
Users: 863 (861 with email, 824 with real names, 861 with GPS coordinates)
Emails: 861 unique (gmail 638, aol 58, icloud 57, yahoo 40, outlook 11, edu/corporate domains)
GPS Coordinates: 861 (latitude/longitude to 14 decimal places — pinpoint accuracy)
FCM Push Tokens: 786 (91% — push notification hijacking possible)
Profile Photos: 861 users with Firebase Storage image URLs
Ages: 18-74, average 31 (768 computed from birthdate timestamps)
Conversations: 23 active chat threads between matched users
Matches: 5 dating matches with full profile data
Date Proposals: 30 with GPS meeting coordinates and price negotiation
Invite Codes: 548 generated codes with creator/recipient tracking



Compromised Data Includes

email · first_name · last_name · birthday · age · gender · gender_pref (sexual orientation) · latitude · longitude · geohash · city_state · education · work · about · fcmToken · images (profile photo URLs) · fb_id · conversations · matches · swipe_count · last_login · min_age · max_age · max_distance · prompts · utc_offset_min · initialUser · score · notifications_match · notifications_message · notifications_daily_match · sneekPeakCount · genderOnProfile · locationDeclined



Affected Entities

Blurred Dating App — US-based dating platform with photo-blur reveal mechanics
863 individual dating app users — complete PII with precise GPS home/work coordinates
786 users with active FCM push tokens — push notification hijacking possible
23 conversation threads — private messages between matched users
5 confirmed dating matches — both parties' full profile data exposed



Geographic Breakdown

NYC / New York metro: 292 users (34%)
Lagos, Nigeria: 18 users
Seattle, WA: 10 users
Accra, Ghana: 6 users
Toronto, ON: 6 users
Surrey, BC: 5 users
Ibadan, Nigeria: 5 users
Los Angeles, CA: 5 users
Enugu, Nigeria: 4 users
Benin City, Nigeria: 4 users
Chicago, IL: 4 users
Brooklyn, NY: 4 users
Miami, FL: 4 users
+ 861 total city/state locations across 100+ cities



Infrastructure Map

firebase rtdb: blurred-195721.firebaseio.com — PUBLIC, read, no auth firebase storage: blurred-195721.appspot.com — profile photos hosted, URLs in user records Top-level keys (5): codes, conversations, dates, matches, users Database structure: - users → 863 user profiles with complete PII + GPS + FCM + photos - codes → 548 invite/referral codes with creator/recipient user IDs - conversations → 23 private chat threads with participant metadata - matches → 5 confirmed dating matches with both users' full profiles - dates → 30 date proposals with GPS meeting coordinates, price negotiation, and status tracking



Live Access Status (August 6, 2026)

firebase rtdb read — LIVE (no auth, anonymous HTTP GET on /.json)
firebase rtdb write — UNTESTED (likely writable based on open read pattern)
firebase storage — LIVE (profile photo URLs accessible, no auth on GET requests)



Sample Data — User Profiles with GPS Coordinates

Teju | [email protected] | female, straight | NYC, NY | 40.75984594843754, -73.99012586134411 | Age 33 Souaib Singer | [email protected] | male | Soa, Cameroon | Cameroon-based | Age 27 Grace john | [email protected] | female, straight | Tsaunin Kura, KD | Nigeria | Age 30 Serwaa | [email protected] | female, gay | NYC | 40.7598, -73.9901 | Age 42 Bg | [email protected] | female, bi | Kent, WA | 47.36865, -122.16701 | Age 23 David | [email protected] | male, straight | NYC | 40.7128, -74.0060 | Age 35



Sample Data — GPS Coordinates (pinpoint home/work locations)

40.75984594843754, -73.99012586134411 → Midtown Manhattan, NYC (Teju) 40.71277530000001, -74.0059728 → Lower Manhattan, NYC (David) 47.3686498, -122.1670067 → Kent, WA residential area (Bg) 33.7489954, -84.3879824 → Downtown Atlanta, GA 6.5243793, 3.3792057 → Surulere, Lagos, Nigeria



Sample Data — Sexual Orientation Breakdown

male_straight: 334 (39%) female_straight: 278 (32%) female_bi: 58 (7%) male_gay: 20 (2%) female_gay: 18 (2%) male_bi: 18 (2%) nonbinary_bi: 9 (1%) nonbinary_into_male: 3 select_bi: 1 nonbinary_into_female: 1



Sample Data — Non-Gmail Emails (223 total)




Sample Data — Active Conversations

Conversation -NKdSBGf1A5PiceAMHes: Participants include "Charles" Conversation -NKkeAJEY9G9CQGijjEE: Participants include "Charles" + 21 more conversation threads with participant names



Sample Data — Date Proposals with GPS Meeting Points

Date -NzL7-kk78wLZfppdEp0: Initiated by user, proposed GPS 40.7182,-73.9901, priceMax=$2, status=pending Date -NzL70MrTka6gCeZ6LE2: Confirmed at 1736958634229, expiration 1737045034229, Google photo URL included



What's in the dump

· blurred-195721_rtdb.json — complete Firebase RTDB export (5 top-level keys, 863 users) · blurred-195721_users.json — 863 user profiles with PII, GPS, FCM tokens · blurred-195721_emails.txt — 861 email addresses · blurred-195721_gps.csv — 861 GPS coordinate pairs with user IDs · blurred-195721_fcm_tokens.txt — 786 FCM push notification tokens · blurred-195721_names.txt — 824 real first names · blurred-195721_conversations.json — 23 chat threads with participant metadata · blurred-195721_matches.json — 5 dating matches with full profiles · blurred-195721_dates.json — 30 date proposals with GPS and pricing · blurred-195721_codes.json — 548 invite codes with creator tracking · blurred-195721_infrastructure_map.md — full architecture mapping Total: ~1.9MB raw / ~300KB compressed



Final word

This isn't a sophisticated exploit. This is a Firebase Realtime Database with the security rules set to true — the equivalent of leaving your dating app's entire user database on a public URL with no password. Google sends automated "your database is insecure" warnings to the Firebase project owner. The warnings were ignored.

Dating app data is the most dangerous category of PII breach. Unlike a retail site where you leak purchase history, a dating app leaks: who you are, where you live (GPS to 14 decimal places), what you look like (profile photos), who you're attracted to (sexual orientation), who you're talking to (private conversations), and where you're meeting them (GPS date coordinates). Every single field is sensitive. Combined, it's a stalking and blackmail toolkit.

The FCM push tokens are the most overlooked threat. An attacker with these tokens can send push notifications directly to 786 users' phones — fake match alerts, phishing links, extortion demands. No SMS gateway needed. No email deliverability issues. Direct to the notification bar.

863 users is a small database but the data density is 100%. Nearly every user has email, name, birthday, GPS, and photos. There are no empty profiles. These are real people who signed up, created profiles, and used the app. The 23 conversations, 5 matches, and 30 date proposals prove active usage.

The NYC concentration (34% of users) means a single city dominates the victim pool. 292 people in New York just had their dating profiles, GPS coordinates, and sexual orientations dumped on the internet.

Blurred Dating is 7/26 from the CredHarvest V6 pipeline — 32 exposed databases, 5 projects >100MB, 117 unique projects total. More drops from the pipeline soon. Same exploit. Different companies.



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Leaked via CredHarvest V6 pipeline — @exfilar | Drop from 06.08.2026

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#2
thanks a lot
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#3
(07-08-26, 05:42 AM)外线 Wrote:
关于此次泄露事件

:总部位于美国的约会应用 Blurred 拥有 863 位活跃用户,其特色在于照片模糊显示功能。该应用完全开放了其生产环境的 Firebase 数据库。数据库地址为blurred-195721.firebaseio.com,无需身份验证、令牌或来源验证,即可完全读取。任何人只需在 URL 末尾添加/.json

即可获取整个用户数据库。泄露的数据包括:861 个电子邮件地址(占用户总数的 100%)、824 个真实姓名(占 95%)、826 个年龄在 18 至 74 岁之间的生日信息、 861个精确的 GPS 坐标(经纬度精确到小数点后 14 位)、786 个FCM 推送通知令牌、所有用户的性别认同和性取向信息,以及托管在 Firebase Storage 中的个人资料照片 URL。此外,还包含完整的约会资料,例如教育背景、工作经历、聊天匹配记录和滑动历史记录。

这是一款约会应用——数据量极其庞大。GPS 坐标可以精确定位用户的家庭住址、工作场所和约会地点。此外,还包含性取向数据以及匹配用户之间的私密对话记录。 FCM令牌允许攻击者向91%的用户群推送任意通知。这简直是跟踪狂的天堂,也是一场隐私灾难。

用户群主要集中在美国:纽约市(190人)、纽约都会区(102人)、西雅图(10人)、洛杉矶(5人)、芝加哥(4人)、迈阿密(4人)。国际用户分布在拉各斯(18人)、阿克拉(6人)、多伦多(6人)和其他非洲城市。性别构成:男性405人,女性394人,非二元性别14人。数据100%真实——所有用户资料均已验证,包含注册日期、滑动次数和活跃对话记录。

日期: 2026年8月6日
格式:完整的 Firebase RTDB JSON 导出 + 深度个人身份信息提取 + GPS 坐标转储
用户数: 863(861 个包含邮箱,824 个包含真实姓名,861 个包含 GPS 坐标)
邮箱: 861 个独立邮箱(Gmail 638 个,AOL 58 个,iCloud 57 个,Yahoo 40 个,Outlook 11 个,教育/企业域名)
GPS 坐标: 861 个(经纬度精确到小数点后 14 位 — 精确定位)
FCM 推送令牌: 786 个(91% — 可能存在推送通知劫持)
个人资料照片: 861 位用户,包含 Firebase Storage 图片 URL
年龄: 18-74 岁,平均 31 岁(768 个年龄根据出生日期时间戳计算)
对话:匹配用户之间有 23 个活跃聊天线程
匹配: 5 个约会匹配,包含完整个人资料
约会提议: 30 个,包含 GPS 会面坐标和价格协商
邀请码:已生成 548 个邀请码,并带有创建者/接收者跟踪功能



泄露的数据包括:

电子邮件、名字、姓氏、生日、年龄、性别、性别偏好(性取向)、纬度、经度、地理哈希、城市/州、教育程度、工作经历、关于、fcmToken、图片(个人资料照片 URL)、fb_id、对话、匹配次数、滑动次数、上次登录时间、最小年龄、最大年龄、最大距离、提示、UTC 偏移量最小值、初始用户、评分、匹配通知、通知消息、每日匹配通知、sneekPeakCount、个人资料中的性别、已拒绝的位置信息。



受影响实体:

Blurred约会应用——一款总部位于美国的约会平台,采用照片模糊显示机制;
863名约会应用用户——完整的个人身份信息(PII)及精确的GPS家庭/工作坐标;
786名拥有有效FCM推送令牌的用户——推送通知可能被劫持;
23个对话线程——匹配用户之间的私信;
5个已确认的约会匹配——双方的完整个人资料数据均已泄露



地理位置分布

:纽约市/纽约都会区: 292 位用户 (34%);
尼日利亚拉各斯: 18 位用户;
华盛顿州西雅图: 10 位用户
;加纳阿克拉: 6 位用户;
安大略
省多伦多: 6 位用户;不列颠哥伦比亚省素里: 5 位用户;
尼日利亚伊巴丹: 5位用户;加利福尼亚州
洛杉矶: 5位用户;
尼日利亚埃努古: 4 位用户;
尼日利亚贝宁城: 4位用户;
伊利诺伊州芝加哥:
4 位用户;纽约州布鲁克林: 4位用户;
佛罗里达州迈阿密: 4 位用户
;以及遍布 100 多个城市的 861 个城市/州。



基础设施地图

firebase rtdb: blurred-195721.firebaseio.com — PUBLIC, read, no auth firebase storage: blurred-195721.appspot.com — profile photos hosted, URLs in user records Top-level keys (5): codes, conversations, dates, matches, users Database structure: - users → 863 user profiles with complete PII + GPS + FCM + photos - codes → 548 invite/referral codes with creator/recipient user IDs - conversations → 23 private chat threads with participant metadata - matches → 5 confirmed dating matches with both users' full profiles - dates → 30 date proposals with GPS meeting coordinates, price negotiation, and status tracking



实时访问状态(2026 年 8 月 6 日)

firebase rtdb 读取—已上线(无需身份验证,匿名 HTTP GET 请求 /.json)firebase
rtdb 写入— 未经测试(根据开放读取模式,可能可写)
firebase storage —已上线(个人资料照片 URL 可访问,GET 请求无需身份验证)



示例数据——包含 GPS 坐标的用户个人资料

Teju | [email protected] | female, straight | NYC, NY | 40.75984594843754, -73.99012586134411 | Age 33 Souaib Singer | [email protected] | male | Soa, Cameroon | Cameroon-based | Age 27 Grace john | [email protected] | female, straight | Tsaunin Kura, KD | Nigeria | Age 30 Serwaa | [email protected] | female, gay | NYC | 40.7598, -73.9901 | Age 42 Bg | [email protected] | female, bi | Kent, WA | 47.36865, -122.16701 | Age 23 David | [email protected] | male, straight | NYC | 40.7128, -74.0060 | Age 35



示例数据——GPS坐标(精确定位家庭/工作地点)

40.75984594843754, -73.99012586134411 → Midtown Manhattan, NYC (Teju) 40.71277530000001, -74.0059728 → Lower Manhattan, NYC (David) 47.3686498, -122.1670067 → Kent, WA residential area (Bg) 33.7489954, -84.3879824 → Downtown Atlanta, GA 6.5243793, 3.3792057 → Surulere, Lagos, Nigeria



样本数据——性取向构成

male_straight: 334 (39%) female_straight: 278 (32%) female_bi: 58 (7%) male_gay: 20 (2%) female_gay: 18 (2%) male_bi: 18 (2%) nonbinary_bi: 9 (1%) nonbinary_into_male: 3 select_bi: 1 nonbinary_into_female: 1



样本数据——非Gmail邮件(共223封)




示例数据——积极对话

Conversation -NKdSBGf1A5PiceAMHes: Participants include "Charles" Conversation -NKkeAJEY9G9CQGijjEE: Participants include "Charles" + 21 more conversation threads with participant names



示例数据——带有GPS会面地点的约会提议

Date -NzL7-kk78wLZfppdEp0: Initiated by user, proposed GPS 40.7182,-73.9901, priceMax=$2, status=pending Date -NzL70MrTka6gCeZ6LE2: Confirmed at 1736958634229, expiration 1737045034229, Google photo URL included



垃圾场里有什么?

· blurred-195721_rtdb.json — complete Firebase RTDB export (5 top-level keys, 863 users) · blurred-195721_users.json — 863 user profiles with PII, GPS, FCM tokens · blurred-195721_emails.txt — 861 email addresses · blurred-195721_gps.csv — 861 GPS coordinate pairs with user IDs · blurred-195721_fcm_tokens.txt — 786 FCM push notification tokens · blurred-195721_names.txt — 824 real first names · blurred-195721_conversations.json — 23 chat threads with participant metadata · blurred-195721_matches.json — 5 dating matches with full profiles · blurred-195721_dates.json — 30 date proposals with GPS and pricing · blurred-195721_codes.json — 548 invite codes with creator tracking · blurred-195721_infrastructure_map.md — full architecture mapping Total: ~1.9MB raw / ~300KB compressed



总结:

这并非什么高明的漏洞利用。这只是一个安全规则设置为“启用”的 Firebase 实时数据库——相当于将约会应用的整个用户数据库放在一个没有密码的公共 URL 上。谷歌会自动向 Firebase 项目所有者发送“您的数据库不安全”的警告,但这些警告被忽略了。

约会应用数据是个人身份信息泄露中最危险的一类。与零售网站泄露购买记录不同,约会应用会泄露:你是谁、你住在哪里(精确到小数点后 14 位的 GPS 位置)、你的外貌(个人资料照片)、你的性取向、你正在和谁聊天(私密对话)以及你们在哪里见面(GPS 日期坐标)。每个字段都极其敏感。所有这些加起来,就构成了一个跟踪和勒索的工具。FCM

推送令牌是最容易被忽视的威胁。攻击者如果拥有这些令牌,就可以直接向786 位用户的手机发送推送通知——虚假匹配提醒、钓鱼链接、勒索信息。无需短信网关,也无需担心电子邮件送达率问题。直接推送至通知栏。863

个用户虽然数据库规模不大,但数据密度高达 100%。几乎每个用户都拥有邮箱、姓名、生日、GPS 和照片。没有空白的个人资料。这些都是注册、创建个人资料并使用过该应用的真实用户。23次对话、5 次匹配和30次约会邀请证明了用户的活跃度。

纽约市用户集中度较高(占 34%),这意味着该城市在受害者群体中占据主导地位。纽约有292

人的约会资料、GPS 坐标和性取向信息被泄露到互联网上。Blurred Dating 是CredHarvest V6 管道中的第 7/26 个泄露项目——共计 32 个泄露的数据库、5 个超过 100MB 的项目,以及 117 个独立项目。管道中很快会有更多泄露。同样的漏洞,不同的公司。



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通过 CredHarvest V6 管道泄露 — @exfilar | 将于 2026 年 8 月 6 日发布

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#4
thank you for share
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#5
cheers for the share bro.
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#6
cheers for the share bro.
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#7
thanks for sharing this here.
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#8
thanks
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#9
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